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COMMENT
Irving v. Penguin: Historians on Trial
and the Determination of Truth Under
English Libel Law
Dennise Mulvihill*
INTRODUCTION
The Irving v. Penguin2 libel judgment, which denounced
revisionist historian David Irving, was welcomed and heralded
around the world. The public could have been deprived of this
ruling if Irving had originally brought this action in the United
States, where constitutionally-mandated protections of free speech
would have likely prevented him from surviving a summary
judgment motion. Irving, however, brought suit in England, where
plaintiffs can easily establish a prima facie case, and the burden of
proof is on the defendant. In spite of the pro-plaintiff libel laws
favoring Irving, the truth prevailed. Irving was branded a liar, and
Deborah Lipstadt, the author whom Irving sued for libel, was
vindicated through English libel law.
Many critics have denounced English libel law, noting the
chilling effect of libel judgments on the media and free speech.3 In
numerous cases, American courts have refused to enforce English
libel judgments rendered against American defendants on public
policy grounds.4 The European Court of Human Rights also has
* Vanderbilt University, B.A., 1998; J.D. Candidate, 2001, Fordham University. I
dedicate this comment to my family - my parents, Maryanne and Dennis, for their support
and love, and to Brian and Mariah for their unwavering confidence in me. I thank Dan
Shafer for his editorial assistance and encouragement.
2
Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478 (Q.B. Apr. 11,
2000).
3
See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT
(1997); Russell L. Weaver & Geoffrey Bennett, Is the New York Times “Actual Malice”
Standard Really Necessary? A Comparative Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1169
(1993); Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, An Opportunity Lost: The United
Kingdom’s Failed Reform of Defamation Law, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 621, 623-36 (1997).
4
See, e.g., Bachchan v. India Abroad Publn’s Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992)
(holding an English libel judgment could not be recognized, since the court did not have
adequate safeguards to protect freedom of speech and press, which are required by the
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criticized English libel law.5 Anthony Julius, Lipstadt’s solicitor,
noted that Irving v. Penguin was “a sparkling vindication of the
English libel laws.”6 Part I of this Comment will discuss the Irving
v. Penguin decision and English libel law. Part II will examine
Irving v. Penguin under U.S. libel law and will argue that
protections of free speech in U.S. libel law would have prevented
Irving from surviving a summary judgment motion had he brought
suit in the United States. Part III will compare U.S. and English
libel law in light of the Irving judgment.
I. IRVING V. PENGUIN
David Irving brought suit against Penguin Books and Deborah
Lipstadt for libel in the High Court in London in 1994. Justice
Gray found that statements in Lipstadt’s book were libelous of
Irving. The Defendants chose to assert the defense of justification,
or truth. Because English libel law places the burden of proof on
the defendant, Penguin and Lipstadt had to prove that the data and
evidence available to Irving when he was writing his books could
not support Irving’s historical conclusions, and that Irving
deliberately made false statements about history. The Defendants
won the case by proving the truth of the statements in Denying the
Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory7 (“Denying
the Holocaust”) through the testimony and reports of five World
War II and Holocaust historians who examined Irving’s writings
and speeches and the evidence used to support Irving’s statements.
A. The Origins of the Case
In 1993, Penguin Books Ltd. published Professor Deborah
Lipstadt’s book in which she accused David Irving of manipulating
historical data and denying the occurrence of the Holocaust. David
First Amendment); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp 1 (D. D.C. 1995) (holding that
English libel judgment was contrary to public policy and would be denied recognition
under the principles of comity).
5
See, e.g., Miloslavsky v. U.K., 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442 (1995) (holding that a
UK£1.5 million damage award infringed Defendant’s rights under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights).
6
Anthony Julius & James Libson, Losing was Unthinkable, INDEP. (London), Apr.
18, 2000, at 11.
7
DEBORAH E. LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST (Penguin Books, 1994).
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Irving, an English author and self-professed expert on the Third
Reich, sued Penguin Books and Lipstadt for libel in England. The
High Court found for the Defendants, holding that the Defendants
had substantially justified the truth of Lipstadt’s statements.
1. The Parties

In 1993 Deborah Lipstadt, a professor of Modern Jewish and
Holocaust Studies at Emory University, wrote Denying the
Holocaust.8 In her book, Lipstadt examined the origins and
subsequent growth of “Holocaust Denial.”9 She identified several
adherents of this revisionist movement (or “deniers”) and
examined the basis for their beliefs, their methodology, and the
manner in which they deploy their arguments.10 Lipstadt argued
that the deniers represent a clear and present danger since future
generations must learn from the terrible events of the 1930s and
1940s.11 She also discussed the work of David Irving, whom she
considered one of the “most dangerous spokespersons for
Holocaust denial.”12
David Irving has authored over thirty books about World War
II.13 He also has lectured in Australia, Canada, Europe, and the
United States and has participated in numerous radio and
television broadcasts.14 Some scholars have praised Irving for his
thoroughness of research and eloquence of writing.15 Irving,
however, has been criticized in the media and in academic circles
for denying the existence of gas chambers at the Auschwitz

8

See LIPSTADT, supra note 7.
See id.
10
See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 2.1 (Q.B.
Apr. 11, 2000).
11
See id.
12
Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 2.4.
13
Id. ¶ 1.4.
14
See id. ¶ 1.6.
15
See, e.g., Slugging Through the Mud, ECONOMIST (London), Apr. 15, 2000, at 55.
The article stated, in part, that Donald Cameron Watt, a former professor of international
history at London University, wrote of the admiration he had formed for Mr. Irving’s
professionalism when collaborating with him on some research many years previously.
“No book of his ever failed to come up with new evidence,” Mr. Watt was quoted as
saying. John Keegan, a much-respected military historian, also praised Mr. Irving’s
“extraordinary ability to describe and analyse Hitler’s conduct of military
operations.” Id.
9

MULVIHILL.FINAL

220

12/28/00 7:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:217

concentration camp and alleging that the Holocaust is a Jewish
conspiracy.16
David Irving considers himself an expert on Hitler and Nazi
leaders.17 “A central tenet of Irving’s historical writing about the
Nazi era is that Hitler was not [a] . . . ruthless persecutor of
Jews.”18 Irving has asserted that Hitler lost interest in antiSemitism in 1933. He claimed that Hitler never authorized and
indeed was ignorant of the persecution and systematic killing of
the Jews.19 Rather, Irving claimed that Hitler intervened to protect
the Jews from other Nazis.20
2. The Cause of Action
After Penguin Books published Denying the Holocaust in
England, David Irving sued Penguin Books and Deborah Lipstadt
for libel.21 He asserted that certain passages in Lipstadt’s book
“accuse him of being a Nazi apologist and an admirer of Hitler.”22
Irving also alleged that passages indicated that he distorted facts
and manipulated documents “to support his contention that the
Holocaust did not take place.”23
The High Court ruled against David Irving in a scathing
judgment, finding that the Defendants had substantially justified
Lipstadt’s statements.24 The court stated that the Defendants
proved that Irving was a racist, an anti-Semite, and a Holocaust
denier who deliberately misrepresented historical evidence to
exonerate Hitler.25 Irving is now faced with the cost of the defense
bill, which is in excess of UK£3 million.26

16

See, e.g., Frank Rich, Hitler’s Spin Artist, N.Y. TIMES, April 3, 1996, at A15.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 1.5.
18
Id. ¶ 5.1.
19
See id. (maintaining that Hitler lost interest in his former views when he gained
control in 1933).
20
See id.
21
See id. ¶ 1.1.
22
Id. ¶ 1.2.
23
Id.
24
See id. ¶¶ 13.165–14.1.
25
See id. ¶ 13.167.
26
See Roy Ulrich, Going Broke to Defend Yourself, NAT’L L.J., June 12, 2000, at
A21.
17
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B. English Defamation Law
Under English defamation law, plaintiffs easily can establish a
prima facie case of libel. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden of proof is on the defendant. As a result, libel
plaintiffs around the world seek to take advantage of the plaintifffriendly libel laws in England. The law, however, provides that
defendants may choose to assert privilege or the defenses of
justification or fair comment in order to avoid a libel judgment.
1. Establishing a Cause of Action
In England, the modern tort of defamation remains rooted in
long-established common law principles that make it easy for
plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case.27 As a result, many
international libel plaintiffs choose to bring suit in England, and
thereby take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly defamation laws.28
These cases are tried in England because, under English law, the
High Court has jurisdiction to hear libel claims arising over any
work published in England.29
In order to establish a prima facie case of libel in England, the
plaintiff must prove: 1) that the defendant published the allegedly
defamatory statements; 2) that the statement refers to the plaintiff;
and, 3) that the words in question have a defamatory meaning.30
Upon establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff benefits from
a rebuttable presumption that the defamatory statement is false and
therefore does not need to introduce evidence to demonstrate the
statement’s falsity.31 In England there is a no fault requirement,
making libel a strict liability tort.32 Therefore, if a statement is
libelous, the plaintiff can recover damages for reputational harm
27

See Douglas W. Vick & Linda Macpherson, Anglicizing Defamation Law in the
European Union, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 939 (1996).
28
DAVID HOOPER, REPUTATIONS UNDER FIRE 428 (2000).
29
See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 3, at 16 (noting that London is known as the “libel
capital of the world”).
30
See CATHERINE ELLIOT & FRANCES QUINN, TORT LAW 149-52 (1999) (noting that
a statement is defamatory if it “tends to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right
thinking members of society”).
31
See RODNEY A SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:9 (2d ed. 2000); see also DAVID
HOOPER, REPUTATIONS UNDER FIRE 4 (2000).
32
See R.W.M. DIAS & B.S. MARKESINIS, THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS 160 (1976).
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without proof of actual damages.33 General damages are presumed
to result from false publications.34
2. Defenses
English law recognizes the interests of free speech and free press
through several defenses to defamation. For example, defendants
may assert the defenses of justification or fair comment. In
addition, defendants may claim that a particular statement was
privileged.
Justification is an absolute defense to a defamation claim.35
Although a defamatory statement is presumed to be false, a
defendant may avoid liability by proving that the statement is
justified or substantially true.36 Section 5 of the Defamation Act of
1952 does not require defendants to prove that each defamatory
statement is true.37 Section 5, however, does require that the
unproven allegations must not materially injure the plaintiff’s
reputation.38 Thus, the unproven statements must not cause any
additional injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.39 Nonetheless, there
is some risk to asserting the justification defense, since refusing to
admit that the statement was false or continuing to publish it
provides grounds for aggravated damages.40
Defendants may also choose to assert the defense of fair
comment.
Fair comment protects expression of opinions
33

See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 27, at 939-40.
See W.V.H. ROGERS, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ ON TORT 298 (12th ed. 1984).
35
See CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORTS ¶ 21-76 (Brazier et al. eds., 17th ed. 1995).
36
See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.
37
Defamation Act of 1952, c. 66, § 5 (Eng.).
Section 5 states:
In an action for libel or slander in respect of words containing two or more
distinct charges against the plaintiff, a defense of justification shall not fail by
reason only that the truth of every charge is not proved if the words not proved
to be true do not materially injure the plaintiff’s reputation having regard to the
truth of the remaining charges.
Id.
38
See BARENDT ET AL., supra note 3, at 10.
39
See CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORT, supra note 35, ¶ 21-80.
40
See Sutcliffe v. Pressdram Ltd. 1 All E.R. 269, 276-77 (1990). The plaintiff may
request aggravated damages, which asks the jury, or in this case the judge, to take into
account the “need for greater compensation because of the defendants’ particularly bad
behavior.” See PETER KAYE, AN EXPLANATORY GUIDE TO THE ENGLISH LAW OF TORTS
650 (1996) (citing Sutcliffe, 1 All E.R. at 269).
34
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concerning issues of public concern and criticism of government
officials.41 To succeed with this defense, the defendant must prove
that the statement was made without malice and that the facts on
which the statement is based are substantially true.42 English law
does not protect factual errors or opinions based on them.43
English defamation law also provides for two types of
privileges. Some statements made in certain circumstances, such
as during Parliamentary debates or court proceedings, are afforded
an absolute privilege.44 Defendants may also assert a qualified
privilege if they can show that they advanced “legal, social, or
moral duties” by communicating their statements to those with an
interest in receiving them.45 For example, a qualified privilege
attaches to a fair and accurate report of a matter of public interest.
Unlike an absolute privilege, however, a plaintiff can defeat a
qualified privilege by showing malice.46
C. Analysis of Irving v. Penguin
Irving brought a libel suit complaining that certain passages in
Denying the Holocaust were libelous. Justice Gray determined
that Irving established a prima facie case of libel and set forth the
defamatory meaning of the offending statements from Denying the
Holocaust. The Defendants chose to assert the defense of
justification by proving that the statements about Irving were true.
To prove justification, the Defendants used the testimony of five
distinguished historians who had examined Irving’s historical
career, publications, and speeches. After hearing the Defendants’
evidence and Irving’s rebuttal, Justice Gray determined that the
Defendants had proven the truth of most of the statements in
Denying the Holocaust and thus had successfully asserted the
defense of justification.

41

KAYE, supra note 40, at 640-41.
See id. at 642.
43
See HOOPER, supra note 28, at 20.
44
See id. at 21.
45
See CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORT, supra note 35, ¶ 21-106; see also HOOPER,
supra note 28, at 22.
46
See HOOPER, supra note 28, at 22-23.
42
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1. The Libel Claim
When Penguin Books published Lipstadt’s book in England,
Irving alleged that Denying the Holocaust challenged his integrity
and ruined his reputation as a historian. Irving complained that
numerous passages from Denying the Holocaust were libelous of
him. Specifically, Irving cited the following:
Page 14:
The confluence between anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and
Holocaust denial forces was exemplified by a world
anti-Zionist conference scheduled for Sweden in
November 1992. Though cancelled at the last minute
by the Swedish government, scheduled speakers
included black Muslim leader Louis Farrakhan,
Faurisson, Irving and Leuchter. Also scheduled to
participate were representatives of a variety of antiSemitic and anti-Israel organisations, including the
Russian group Pamyat, the Iranian-backed Hezbollah,
and the fundamentalist Islamic organisation Hamas.
Page 111:
Nolte contended that Weizmann’s official declaration
at the outbreak of hostilities gave Hitler good reason
“to be convinced of his enemies’ determination to
annihilate him much earlier than when the first
information about Auschwitz came to the knowledge
of the world.” [. . .] When Nolte was criticized on this
point in light of prewar Nazi persecution of Jews, he
said that he was only quoting David Irving, the rightwing writer of historical works. How quoting Irving
justified using such a historically invalid point
remains unexplained [. . .] As we shall see in
subsequent chapters, Irving [. . .] has become a
Holocaust denier.
These works demonstrate how deniers misstate,
misquote, falsify statistics and falsely attribute
conclusions to reliable sources. They rely on books
that directly contradict their arguments, quoting in a
manner that completely distorts the authors’
objectives. Deniers count on the fact that the vast
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majority of readers will not have access to the
documentation or make the effort to determine how
they have falsified or misconstrued information.
Page 161:
At the second trial Christie and Faurisson were joined
by David Irving, who flew to Toronto in January
1988 to assist in the preparation of Zundel’s second
defense and to testify on his behalf. Scholars have
described Irving as a “Hitler partisan wearing
blinkers” and have accused him of distorting
evidence and manipulating documents to serve his
own purposes. He is best known for his thesis that
Hitler did not know about the Final Solution, an idea
that scholars have dismissed. The prominent British
historian Hugh Trevor-Roper depicted Irving as a
man who “seizes on a small and dubious particle of
‘evidence’” using it to dismiss far-more substantial
evidence that may not support his thesis. His work
has been described as “closer to theology or
mythology than to history,” and he has been accused
of skewing documents and misrepresenting data in
order to reach historically untenable conclusions,
particularly those that exonerate Hitler. An ardent
admirer of the Nazi leader, Irving placed a selfportrait of Hitler over his desk, described his visit to
Hitler’s mountaintop retreat as a spiritual experience,
and declared that Hitler repeatedly reached out to
help the Jews. In 1981 Irving, a self-described
“moderate fascist,” established his own right-wing
political party, founded on his belief that he was
meant to be a future leader of Britain. He is an ultranationalist who believes that Britain has been on a
steady path of decline accelerated by its decision to
launch a war against Nazi Germany. He has
advocated that Rudolf Hess should have received the
Nobel Prize for his efforts to try to stop war between
Britain and Germany. On some level Irving seems to
conceive himself as carrying on Hitler’s legacy.
[. . .] Prior to participating in Zundel’s trial, Irving
had appeared at IHR conferences [. . .] but he had
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never denied the annihilation of the Jews. That
changed in 1988 as a result of the events in Toronto.
Both Irving and Faurisson advocated inviting an
American prison warden who had performed gas
executions to testify in Zundel’s defense, arguing that
this would be the best tactic for proving that the gas
chambers were a fraud and too primitive to operate
safely. They solicited help from Bill Armontrout,
warden of the Missouri State Penitentiary, who
agreed to testify and suggested they also contact Fred
A. Leuchter, an “engineer” residing in Boston who
specialized in constructing and installing execution
apparatus. Irving and Faurisson immediately flew off
to meet Leuchter. Irving, who had long hovered on
the edge of Holocaust denial, believed that Leuchter’s
testimony could provide the documentation he needed
to prove the Holocaust a myth. According to
Faurisson, when he first met Leuchter, the Bostonian
accepted the “standard notion of the ‘Holocaust.’”
After spending two days with him, Faurisson declared
that Leuchter was convinced that it was chemically
and physically impossible for the Germans to have
conducted gassings. Having agreed to serve as an
expert witness for the defense, Leuchter then went to
Toronto to meet with Zundel and Christie and to
examine the materials they had gathered for the trial.
Page 179:
David Irving, who during the Zundel trial declared
himself converted by Leuchter’s work to Holocaust
denial and to the idea that the gas chambers were a
myth, described himself as conducting a “one man
intifada” against the official history of the Holocaust.
In his forward to his publication of the Leuchter
Report, Irving wrote that there was no doubt as to
Leuchter’s “integrity” and “scrupulous methods.” He
made no mention of Leuchter’s lack of technical
expertise or of the many holes that had been poked in
his findings. Most important, Irving wrote, “Nobody
likes to be swindled, still less where considerable
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sums of money are involved.” Irving identified Israel
as the swindler, claiming that West Germany had
given it more than ninety billion deutsche marks in
voluntary reparations, “essentially in atonement for
the ‘gas chambers of Auschwitz.’” According to
Irving the problem was that the latter was a myth that
would “not die easily.” He subsequently set off to
promulgate Holocaust denial notions in various
countries. Fined for doing so in Germany, in his
courtroom appeal against the fine he called on the
court to “fight a battle for the German people and put
an end to the blood lie of the Holocaust which has
been told against this country for fifty years.” He
dismissed the memorial to the dead at Auschwitz as a
“tourist attraction.” He traced the origins of the myth
to an “ingenious plan” of the British Psychological
Warfare Executive, which decided in 1942 to spread
the propaganda story that Germans were “using ‘gas
chambers’ to kill millions of Jews and other
‘undesirables.’”
Branding Irving and Leuchter “Hitler’s heirs,” the
British House of Commons denounced the former as
a “Nazi propagandist and long time Hitler apologist”
and the latter’s report as a “fascist publication.” One
might have assumed that would have marked the end
of Irving’s reputation in England, but it did not.
Condemned in the Times of London in 1989 as “a
man for whom Hitler is something of a hero and
almost everything of an innocent and for whom
Auschwitz is a Jewish deception,” Irving may have
had his reputation revived in 1992 by the London
Sunday Times. The paper hired Irving to translate the
Goebbels diaries, which had been discovered in a
Russian archive and, it was assumed, would shed
light on the conduct of the Final Solution. The paper
paid Irving a significant sum plus a percentage of the
syndication fees.
The Russian archives granted Irving permission to
copy two microfiche plates, each of which held about
forty-five pages of the diaries. Irving immediately
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violated his agreement, took many plates, transported
them abroad, and had them copied without archival
permission. There is serious concern in archival
circles that he may have significantly damaged the
plates when he did so, rendering them of limited use
to subsequent researchers.
Irving believes Jews are “very foolish not to abandon
the gas chamber theory while they still have time.”
He “foresees [a] new wave of anti-semitism” [sic]
due to Jews’ exploitation of the Holocaust “myth”,
C.C. Aronsfeld, “Holocaust revisionists are Busy in
Britain,” Midstream, Jan. 1993, p.29.
Journalists and scholars alike were shocked that the
Times chose such a discredited figure to do this work.
Showered with criticism, the editor of the Sunday
Times, Andrew Neil, denounced Irving’s view as
“reprehensible” but defended engaging Irving
because he was only being used as a “transcribing
technician.” Peter Pulzer, a professor of politics at
Oxford and an expert on the Third Reich, observed
that it was ludicrous for Neil to refer to Irving as a
“mere technician,” arguing that when you hired
someone to edit a “set of documents others had not
seen you took on the whole man.”
However the matter is ultimately resolved, the
Sunday Times had rescued Irving’s reputation from
the ignominy to which it had been consigned by the
House of Commons. In the interest of a journalistic
scoop, this British paper was willing to throw its task
as a gatekeeper of the truth and of journalistic ethics
to the winds. By resuscitating Irving’s reputation, it
also gave new life to the Leuchter Report.
Page 181:
A similar attitude is evident in the media reviews of
David Irving’s books: Most rarely address his
neofascist or denial connections.
Irving is one of the most dangerous spokespersons for
Holocaust denial. Familiar with historical evidence,
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he bends it until it conforms with his ideological
leanings and political agenda. A man who is
convinced that Britain’s great decline was accelerated
by its decision to go to war with Germany, he is mist
[sic] facile at taking accurate information and shaping
it to confirm his conclusions. A review of his recent
book, Churchill’s War, which appeared in New York
Review of Books, accurately analyzed his practice of
applying a double standard of evidence. He demands
“absolute documentary proof” when it comes to
proving the Germans guilty, but he relies on highly
circumstantial evidence to condemn the Allies. This
is an accurate description not only of Irving’s tactics,
but of those of deniers in general.
Page 213:
As we have seen above, Nolte, echoing David Irving,
argues that the Nazi “internment” of Jews was
justified because of Chaim Weizmann’s September
1939 declaration that the Jews of the world would
fight Nazism.
Page 221:
Another legal maneuver has been adopted by a
growing number of countries. They have barred entry
rights to known deniers. David Irving, for example,
has been barred from Germany, Austria, Italy and
Canada. Australia is apparently also considering
barring him.47
At trial, the Defendants did not contest that the quoted
passages referred to Irving. Justice Gray stated in his
judgment that all readers of the book would have understood
the passages discussing Holocaust deniers generally to refer
to Irving individually.48 The Defendants also did not contest
the issue of publication.
In order to determine how readers would interpret the
statements about Irving in Denying the Holocaust, both the
47

See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 2.4 (Q.B.
Apr. 11, 2000).
48
See id. ¶ 2.7.
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Defendants and the Plaintiff were required to set forth the
defamatory meaning of the statements.
Justice Gray
accepted neither the Defendants’ nor the Plaintiff’s proposed
interpretation.49 Rather, he determined how an ordinary
reader of Denying the Holocaust would understand the
statements.50 Justice Gray determined the natural and
ordinary meaning of the Defendant’s statements in the
opinion noting:

49
50

i.

that Irving is an apologist for and partisan
of Hitler, who has resorted to the
distortion of evidence; the manipulation
and skewing of documents; the
misrepresentation of data and the
application of double standards to the
evidence, in order to serve his own
purpose of exonerating Hitler and
portraying him as sympathetic towards the
Jews;

ii.

that Irving is one of the most dangerous
spokespersons for Holocaust denial, who
has on numerous occasions denied that the
Nazis embarked upon the deliberate
planned extermination of Jews and has
alleged that it is a Jewish deception that
gas chambers were used by the Nazis at
Auschwitz as a means of carrying out such
extermination;

iii.

that Irving, in denying that the Holocaust
happened, has misstated evidence;
misquoted sources; falsified statistics;
misconstrued information and bent
historical evidence so that it conforms to
his neo-fascist political agenda and
ideological beliefs;

iv.

that Irving has allied himself with
representatives of a variety of extremist
and anti-Semitic groups and individuals

See id. ¶¶ 2.13-.14.
See id.
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and on one occasion agreed to participate
in a conference at which representatives of
terrorist organizations were due to speak;
v.

that Irving, in breach of an agreement
which he had made and without
permission, removed and transported
abroad certain microfiches of Goebbels’
diaries, thereby exposing them to a real
risk of damage;

vi.

that Irving is discredited as an historian.51

2. Defendants Assertion of Justification
Lipstadt and Penguin Books chose to assert the defense of
justification.52 In proving justification, the Defendants had to
establish that all of the statements that Irving complained of were
substantially true in their ordinary and natural sense.53 The
Defense had to establish not only that Irving’s work was riddled
with errors, but also that he deliberately misstated facts and
distorted historical evidence to advance his political and
ideological views.54 As a result, the defendants had the difficult
task of proving allegations about Irving’s state of mind, as early as
30 years ago, at the time he was writing his books.
The Defendants relied heavily on the evidence of five
distinguished academic historians: Richard Evans, Professor of
Modern History at the University of Cambridge; Robert Jan van
Pelt, Professor of Architecture at the University of Waterloo;
Christopher Browning, Professor of History at Pacific Lutheran
University; Dr. Peter Longerich, Reader in the Department of
German at the University of London; and Hajo Funke, Professor of
Political Science at the Free University of Berlin.55 These
witnesses examined all of Irving’s publications, the evidence he
used to support his conclusions, and the available evidence that

51
52
53
54
55

Id. ¶ 2.15.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 1.2.
See id. ¶ 4.2.
See id. ¶ 13.138.
See id. ¶ 4.17.
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Irving chose not to use.56 Together their expert reports totaled over
2,000 pages.57
3. The Court’s Analysis
In his decision, Justice Gray thoroughly examined all of the
historical evidence provided by the Defendants. At the beginning
of the judgment and again before the conclusion, the Judge
emphasized that his function was to decide the question of Irving’s
treatment of evidence, not to make findings as to what happened
during the Nazi regime.58 In a neutral tone, he enumerated all of
the Defendants’ evidence and arguments and Irving’s response to
each item. In his conclusion, Justice Gray stated which arguments
prevailed with respect to each claim.59
The opinion addressed several major areas of debate: Irving’s
historiography, the systematic killing of the Jews outside of
Auschwitz, the gas chambers of Auschwitz, the bombing of
Dresden, Irving’s research trip to the Russian archives, and
Irving’s anti-Semitism and right-wing associations.60
The
Defendants examined Irving’s writings and speeches on these
topics to demonstrate that the evidence did not support his
historical conclusions and that his Holocaust denial was motivated
by his political and ideological beliefs.61 Ultimately, the Judge
concluded that the Defendants had substantially justified their
statements.62
a. Irving’s Historiography
The Defendants criticized Irving’s untenable conclusions about
several moments in history. The major criticisms were of Irving’s
contention that Hitler bore no responsibility for Kristallnacht and
his failure to indicate to his readers when he was speculating rather
than stating facts. The Defendants also challenged Irving’s
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

See id. ¶¶ 5.1-.12.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 4.17.
See id. ¶¶ 1.3, 13.3.
See id. ¶¶ 13.1-.162.
See id. ¶¶ V, VI, VII, IX, X, XI, XII.
See id. ¶ 5.3.
See id. ¶ 13.167.
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interpretation and translation of several Nazi documents that
downplayed Hitler’s role in the extermination of the Jews.63
The Defendants hired Professor Richard Evans, author of
numerous books about Germany, to write a report about Irving’s
historiography, his denial of the Holocaust, and his exculpation of
Hitler.64 Professor Evans’ lengthy report included numerous
examples of Irving’s portrayal of Hitler, a portrayal which Evans
claimed was entirely at odds with the available evidence.65 He
cited many instances in which Irving allegedly distorted the
historical record by suppressing evidence and using unreliable
sources in order to ultimately arrive at irrational conclusions about
events and documents.66 Professor Evans also criticized passages
in which Irving wrote about Hitler in inappropriately flattering
terms.67
Irving countered each of Professor Evans’ historiographical
criticisms by supporting his use, or interpretation, of a particular
document and by challenging the authenticity of documents put
forth by the Defendants.68 He denied that he falsified history to
portray Hitler in a more favorable light and argued that he had
every right to praise Hitler.69 Irving stated that he frequently
included material in his books which discredited Hitler and other
Nazi leaders.70 He also claimed that he always indicated in a
footnote where the document could be found and often quoted the
document in the original German, behavior that he claimed was
inconsistent with the charge of being a historian who wishes to
mislead his readers.71
Justice Gray found that the Defendants’ assertion that Irving had
seriously misrepresented Hitler’s views on the Jewish question was
justified.72
Justice Gray found that Irving deliberately
misrepresented Hitler’s views by mistranslating or omitting
63

See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 5.1-.249.
See id. ¶ 4.17.
65
See id. ¶ 5.5.
66
See id.
67
See id. For example, in Irving’s book, Hitler’s War, he described Hitler as “a
friend of the arts, benefactor of the impoverished, defender of the innocent, persecutor of
the delinquent.” Id.
68
See id. ¶ 5.9.
69
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 5.10.
70
See id. ¶ 5.11.
71
See id. ¶ 5.12.
72
See id. ¶ 13.31.
64
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documents or parts of documents and that this misrepresentation
was deliberate.73 Finally, Justice Gray stated that the picture of
Hitler that Irving provided readers conflicted with the evidence.74
b. Hitler’s Involvement in the Systematic Killing
Outside of Auschwitz
The Defendants criticized Irving’s general representation of
Hitler’s attitude toward the Jews and his involvement in the policy
to exterminate them.75 Irving’s view of Hitler may be summarized
by his statement that Hitler was “the best friend the Jews had in the
Third Reich.”76
To justify the Defendants’ criticism of Irving, Dr. Peter
Longerich, a specialist in the Nazi era, gave evidence of Hitler’s
role in the persecution of the Jews under the Nazi regime and of
the systematic character of the Nazi policy for the extermination of
the Jews.77 Christopher Browning, a Professor of History at
Pacific Lutheran University, presented evidence of the
implementation of the Final Solution, which involved shooting
Jews in the East and gassing Jews in camps other than
Auschwitz.78
Based on the evidence presented by Dr. Longerich and Professor
Browning, the Defendants contended that, beginning in December
1941, Heinrich Himmler embarked on a giant homicidal gassing
program of Jews throughout Europe at camps specially designed
for that purpose.79 There is no explicit evidence that Himmler and
Hitler discussed the extermination.80 The Defendants, however,
argued that in light of the fact that the program was overseen by
Himmler, the frequency with which Himmler and Hitler met, and
the evidence of Hitler’s thoughts and public statements about Jews,
73

See id. ¶¶ 13.51, 13.140.
See id. ¶ 13.141.
75
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 6.1.
76
Id. ¶ 6.9. During the course of the trial, Irving conceded that Hitler must have
known about the gassing after 1943, that he knew and approved of the program of
shooting Jews, and that the Reinhardt camps at Chelmo, Treblinka, and Sobibor were
Nazi killing centers where hundreds of thousands of Jews were killed. See id. ¶ 13.152.
77
See id. ¶ 4.17.
78
See id.
79
See id. ¶¶ 6.73-.77.
80
See id. ¶¶ 6.23-.38.
74
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it is inconceivable that Hitler was unaware of, or did not authorize,
the mass extermination of Jews by gassing.81
In response, Irving maintained that Hitler lost interest in antiSemitism after he came to power, and only espoused anti-Semitic
views for political reasons.82 He also wrote that Hitler did not
know, or approve of, the policy of mass shooting and gassing of
Jews in certain parts of Europe.83 Irving maintained that Hitler
favored solving the “Jewish Problem” by means of deportation
rather than extermination.84
Justice Gray accepted the testimony of Professor Browning and
Dr. Longerich. He concluded the evidence disclosed substantial, if
not wholly irrefutable, proof that Hitler was not only aware of the
gassing at the Reinhard camps, but also was consulted on, and
approved of, the extermination.85 The Judge found that if Hitler
knew, and approved of, extermination by shooting, it was
reasonable to assume that he approved of extermination by other
means.86 Justice Gray found it unreasonable to assume that
Himmler could, or would have, concealed from Hitler an
extermination program of such magnitude.87
c. Auschwitz
The Defendants challenged Irving’s view that no Jews died in
gas chambers at Auschwitz, a position adopted by Irving after
reading the Leuchter Report.88 The Defendants introduced
evidence that indicated Auschwitz was an extermination camp
where approximately one million Jews were put to death in gas
chambers between 1941 and 1944.89 The court had to decide
81

See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 6.1, 6.38
See id. ¶ 6.8.
83
See id. ¶ 6.13.
84
See id. ¶ 6.9.
85
See id. ¶ 13.67.
86
See id.
87
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.67.
88
See id. ¶ 7.9 (noting that Mr. Fred Leuchter was described by Irving as “a
professional consultant who routinely advised penitentiaries on electric chair and gaschamber execution procedures”). Leuchter’s report, entitled “An Engineering Report on
the Alleged Execution Gas Chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau and Majdanek Poland,”
concluded that no gas chambers operated at Auschwitz. Irving regarded that report as an
important historical document and adopted its major conclusions. Id.
89
See id. ¶ 7.6.
82
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whether the evidence could possibly support Irving’s contention
that Auschwitz was one of the many labor camps established by
the Nazis and not an extermination camp.90
The Defendants used the testimony of Professor Robert Jan van
Pelt, who has studied and written extensively on Auschwitz.91 The
Defendants claimed that the totality of the evidence, including
camp blueprints, eyewitness accounts, documents relating to the
capacity of the crematoria, and the amount of cyanide gas
delivered to the camp, amounted to convincing proof of the mass
extermination of the Jews by gas.92
During the course of the trial, Irving modified his opinion and
conceded that there had been one gas chamber at Auschwitz, but
claimed it was used solely to fumigate or delouse clothing.93 He
also accepted that Jews were gassed “at some scale” at the camp.94
Irving, however, firmly denied the claim advanced by Professor
van Pelt, that 500,000 Jews died in a certain morgue at
Auschwitz.95
In asserting that there were no homicidal gas chambers, Irving
relied on the fact that there was no reference to the commissioning,
construction, or operation of crematoria for genocidal purposes.96
Irving challenged the eyewitness evidence, claiming that the
inmates’ testimonies were influenced by stories that they had heard
after the war.97 He also claimed that the Nazi testimony was
unreliable because it was given at post-war trials by prisoners who
wished to ingratiate themselves with their captors.98 Further,
Irving maintained that the roof of Morgue 1 at Crematorium 2
showed no sign of the wire-mesh columns through which gas was
introduced into the chamber.99 He also relied on the fact that daily
reports sent from Auschwitz to Berlin contained no mention of
inmates being gassed, although they did catalogue lists of inmates’
90

See id. ¶¶ 7.6, 7.8.
See id. ¶ 4.17.
92
See id. ¶ 7.75.
93
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 7.89. For this proposition, Irving relied on the
Leuchter Report. See id.
94
See id. ¶ 7.11.
95
See id.
96
See id. ¶¶ 7.102-.105.
97
See id. ¶ 7.110.
98
See id.
99
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 7.91. Van Pelt contends that the gas chamber was
located in Morgue 1 of Crematoria 2. See id. ¶¶ 7.60-.62.
91
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deaths from natural causes, hangings, and shootings.100 In
addition, he noted that the amount of fuel, reportedly delivered to
Auschwitz for the crematoria, was insufficient to sustain the
number of bodies the Defendants had claimed were cremated.101
During Irving’s cross examination of Professor van Pelt, van
Pelt testified that he relied exclusively on eyewitness accounts
recorded immediately after the war so that “cross pollination” of
survivors’ stories was not likely to have occurred.102 Additionally,
while Defendants admitted that not all eyewitness evidence was
reliable, the “convergence” or similarity of the accounts, along
with documentation of the accounts, tended to prove the
eyewitnesses’ validity.103 Furthermore, van Pelt stated that less
fuel could be used in a crematorium if several bodies were burned
simultaneously.104 He testified that the morgue was not originally
built as a gas chamber, but was later redesigned to make it easier
for gassings to take place.105 Van Pelt finally concluded that the
roofs of the crematoria were destroyed, rendering it impossible to
determine whether there were once holes into which the pellets
containing cyanide could be poured.106
Justice Gray held that no fair-minded historian could doubt the
existence of gas chambers at Auschwitz and their use to
exterminate hundreds of thousands of Jews.107 Although he stated
that Irving made valuable criticisms about individual pieces of the
Defendants’ evidence, the totality of evidence led to the conclusion
that there were in fact homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz.108
Justice Gray found that an objective historian would not consider
the apparent absence of holes on the morgue roof to be a sufficient
reason to discount the cumulative effect of the remaining
evidence.109

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

See id. ¶ 7.103.
See id. ¶ 7.100.
See id. ¶ 7.34.
See id. ¶ 7.75.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 7.125.
See id. ¶ 7.121.
See id. ¶ 7.120.
See id. ¶ 13.91.
See id. ¶ 13.83.
See id.

MULVIHILL.FINAL

238

12/28/00 7:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:217

d. The Goebbels Diary
In 1992, Irving went to Moscow to examine, and offer to
purchase, glass microfiche plates of Josef Goebbels’ diary.110 The
issue before the court was whether Irving broke an agreement with
the Moscow archive in connection with his examination of
Goebbels’ diary.111 The court also addressed whether Irving
endangered certain plates when he removed them from the
archive.112
The Defendants alleged that Irving broke an agreement with the
Moscow archive by removing three glass plates, including the one
generally considered to be the most historically important, without
permission.113 The Defendants suggested that, by removing the
plates, Irving risked damaging the fragile historical documents.114
The Defendants relied on Irving’s diary entries to illustrate the
breach.115 They argued that a historian should seek permission
before removing documents from an archive, and by failing to get
permission, Irving breached an agreement.116 The Defendants
claimed that Irving risked damage to the plates by removing them,
leaving them in a hiding place on the ground for an afternoon, and
subjecting them to forensic testing.117
Irving did not contest that he removed the plates to have them
copied and tested.118 He claimed, however, that he had no formal
agreement with the archive and, therefore, could not have breached
an agreement.119 Irving maintained that he was compelled to
remove the documents because he feared that the archive would be
sealed before he could adequately study certain plates.120 Irving
also asserted that at no time did he endanger the plates since they

110

See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 12.1-.2 (Paul Joseph Goebbels (1897-1945), a
virulent hater of Jews and other “non-Arayan” groups, was Reichsminister for
Propaganda and National Enlightenment during the Nazi regime from 1933 to 1945.).
111
See id. ¶ 12.3.
112
See id.
113
See id. ¶ 12.5.
114
See id.
115
See id. ¶¶ 12.10-.11.
116
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 12.11.
117
See id. ¶¶ 12.12-.14.
118
See id. ¶ 12.17.
119
See id. ¶ 12.16.
120
See id. ¶ 12.17.
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were wrapped in cardboard and plastic throughout the journey.121
Justice Gray determined that Irving had formed an agreement
with the head archivist through one conversation they had.122
Justice Gray, however, found that an implicit agreement not to
remove the plates could not be inferred from the one negotiation
since the archives were in “a general state of chaos.”123 Therefore,
Irving did not breach an agreement with the archive.124 Justice
Gray also accepted Irving’s assertion that the plates were safe at all
times.125
e. The Bombing of Dresden
The court addressed the question of whether Irving’s account of
the Allied bombing of Dresden in 1945 was supported by the
evidence.126 In his book, The Destruction of Dresden, and in
subsequent speeches and writings, Irving has claimed that there
were between 60,000 and 250,000 fatalities as a result of the
bombings.127
The Defendants alleged that Irving knowingly relied on a forged
document, known as TB47, and other unreliable evidence, such as
statements by unidentified individuals, to support his claim that
250,000 died in the bombing of Dresden.128 The Defendants
submitted evidence of eleven incidents over twenty-three years
where Irving offered differing numbers of Dresden fatalities.129
They also presented evidence that in 1963 Irving had previously
denounced the Dresden document referred to as TB47.130
Professor Evans testified that due to questions surrounding the
document’s origins, TB47 was clearly a forgery.131
Irving attempted to justify the validity of various documents and
other evidence that he had relied on in his assertions about
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

See id. ¶ 12.19.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.131.
See id. ¶ 13.132.
See id.
See id. ¶ 13.134.
See id. ¶¶ 11.1-.4.
See id. ¶ 11.6.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶¶ 11.9, 11.41, 11.42.
See id. ¶ 11.6.
See id. ¶ 11.10.
See id. ¶ 11.27.
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Dresden.132 Irving stated that after he had learned that his high
estimations of the fatalities were false, he failed to make
corrections in the 1991 edition because the book had already gone
to print.133
Justice Gray found that the evidence surrounding TB47 that
Irving ignored would have been viewed by any dispassionate
historian as proof that the document was fake and that the actual
Dresden death toll was approximately 25,000.134 Further, he stated
that Irving’s estimates of 100,000 or more deaths lacked any
evidential basis.135 The Judge, however, found that the Defendants
had not justified the assertion that Irving invented evidence in
order to support his claims.136
f. Irving’s Holocaust Denial, Anti-Semitism, and
Right Wing Political Associations
The question before the court was whether Irving was a
Holocaust denier and whether his denials were justified.137 The
court also addressed whether Irving’s statements about Jews and
Blacks qualified him as an anti-Semite and a racist.138 In addition,
the court looked at Irving’s political affiliations to determine
whether he associated with right-wing political organizations.139
Professor Evans testified on behalf of the defendants that the
following were typical views held by a “Holocaust Denier”:
i.

[T]hat Jews were not killed in gas chambers or at least not
on any significant scale;

ii. [T]hat the Nazis had no policy and made no systematic
attempt to exterminate the European Jewry and that such
deaths as did occur were the consequence of individual
excess unauthorized at the senior level;

132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

See id. ¶ 11.8.
See id. ¶ 11.40.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.123.
See id. ¶ 13.126.
See id. ¶ 13.127.
See id. ¶ 8.15.
See id. ¶ 9.1.
See id. ¶ 10.3.
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iii. [T]hat the number of Jews murdered did not run into the
millions and that the true death toll was far lower;
iv. [T]hat the Holocaust is largely or entirely a myth invented
by Allied propagandists and sustained after the war by
Jews in order to obtain financial support for the newlycreated state of Israel.140
Through speeches and writings the Defendants showed that
Irving held many of the views described above.141 The Defendants
then used the evidence of their expert historians to show that these
statements were false.142
The Defendants relied primarily on Irving’s speeches to various
groups worldwide to illustrate his history of racism and antiSemitism.143 Some particularly emotive moments in the trial
included videos of Irving speaking to a group of skinheads
chanting “sieg heil”144 and telling a Canadian audience that “more
people died in the back of Senator Kennedy’s car at
Chappaquiddick than died in the gas chambers at Auschwitz.”145
The Defendants also presented quotations by Irving stating that he
felt queasy seeing black men play cricket for England and calling
the AIDS epidemic a ‘Final Solution’ which will wipe out blacks,
homosexuals, drug addicts, and the sexually promiscuous.146
Professor Hajo Funke introduced evidence of Irving’s
association with right-wing individuals and pro-Nazi groups in
Germany.147 Professor Funke testified that Irving has spoken, and
attended meetings, at many Nazi, right-wing, and anti-Semitic
organizations.148
Irving objected to the Defendants’ use of his speeches, claiming
that it is customary to use more colorful language in speech than in
writing.149 He claimed that by making certain statements about
Jews he was merely explaining to Jews why there is anti140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149

See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 8.4.
See id. ¶¶ 8.6, 8.17, 8.20, 8.29.
See id. ¶ 8.21-.24.
See id. ¶ 9.5.
“Seig heil” is a Nazi salute.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 8.17, viii.
See id. ¶ 9.6.
See id. ¶ 10.5.
See id. ¶¶ 10.8-.25.
See id. ¶¶ 9.8, 13.94.
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Semitism.150 By his characterization of Jewish stereotypes, Irving
claimed that he intended to warn Jews not to encourage negative
public perception by behaving in certain ways.151 He also stated
that Jews should not be protected from his criticism.152 In order to
prove that he was not a racist, Irving said that he had employed
several members of ethnic minorities.153 Irving argued that the
Defendants were seeking to prove him guilty by association with
certain right-wing individuals.154
Justice Gray found it “to be incontrovertible that Irving qualifies
as a Holocaust denier.”155 He based this decision on the fact that
Irving’s denial of several aspects of the Holocaust was contrary to
the evidence presented.156 The Judge also noted that Irving
expressed his Holocaust denial in offensive terms, such as
dismissing the eyewitnesses en masse as having mental problems
and asking a Holocaust survivor how much money she made from
her tattoo.157
The Judge relied on Irving’s statements to conclude that he was
a racist and an anti-Semite.158 He rejected Irving’s contention that
he was merely expressing to Jews why anti-Semitism exists and
that Jews could be subject to his criticism.159 Justice Gray found
that Irving’s statements could not be read as legitimate criticism of
Jews because the language Irving used was offensive.160 Finally,
even though much of the evidence proffered by the Defendants
was tenuous, Justice Gray found that Irving had associated with
several right-wing groups and individuals.161
4. Justice Gray’s Conclusion
After determining that Irving misrepresented the evidence,
Justice Gray addressed whether this misrepresentation was
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161

See id. ¶ 9.10.
See id.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 9.9.
See id. ¶ 9.18.
See id. ¶ 10.28.
Id. ¶ 13.95.
See id.
See id.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.101.
See id. ¶¶ 13.103-.104.
See id. ¶ 13.103.
See id. ¶¶ 13.111-.115.
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deliberate and motivated by a desire to present Hitler in a more
favorable light.162 The Defendants offered evidence of Irving’s
anti-Semitism and associations with right-wing political groups as
evidence of his state of mind.163 Alternatively, Irving claimed that
if he had misrepresented the evidence, it was a result of innocent
mistakes.164
Justice Gray stated that a significant feature of the case was that
“Irving . . . appeared to make concessions about major issues.”165
The Judge explained that Irving’s readiness to retreat from the
positions set forth in his writing demonstrated “his willingness to
make assertions about the Nazi era which . . . [were] irreconcilable
with the available evidence.”166 In response to Irving’s argument
that his mistakes were all innocent, Justice Gray wrote that all of
Irving’s errors converge, tending to exonerate Hitler and to reflect
Irving’s partisanship for the Nazi leader.167 In addition, the Judge
held that the content of his speeches displayed a distinctly pro-Nazi
and anti-Jewish bias and that he associated with neo-fascists and
appeared to share many of their racist and anti-Semitic
prejudices.168 The Judge found that the Defendants showed that
Irving had a political agenda which disposed him to manipulate the
historical record so that it appeared to conform to his own political
beliefs.169
Justice Gray also found that the Defendants did not justify some
of the statements made in Lipstadt’s book.170 The Defendants
failed to prove that Irving breached an agreement with Russian
archive officials, or that he endangered microfiche plates of great
historical significance.171 The Defendants also failed to justify
their assertion that Irving was scheduled to speak at an anti-Zionist
conference in Sweden in 1992.172 Relying on Section 5 of the
Defamation Act of 1952,173 however, the Judge held that the
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

See id. ¶ 13.136.
See id. ¶¶ 13.160-.163.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.163.
Id. ¶ 13.152.
Id. ¶ 13.159.
See id. ¶ 13.142.
See id. ¶¶ 13.161-.162.
See id. ¶ 13.162.
See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.166.
See id.
See id.
See Defamation Act of 1952, c. 66, § 5 (Eng.).
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proven charges were sufficiently grave to demonstrate that the
Defendant’s failure to prove the truth of certain statements did not
materially affect Irving’s reputation.174
5. Damages
As the losing party in the trial, Irving is responsible for the
Defendant’s legal costs,175 which totaled more than UK£3
million.176 Penguin’s counsel requested an initial payment of
UK£500,000, in response to which Irving argued that such a sum
would preclude him from appealing the decision.177 Finally, on
May 6, 2000, the court ordered Irving to make an initial payment
of UK£150,000 within six weeks.178 Subsequently, the law firm
Irving had hired to represent him on appeal withdrew from the case
“on ideological grounds.” 179
II. IRVING v. PENGUIN EXAMINED UNDER AMERICAN LIBEL
LAW
If David Irving had brought suit in the United States, he would
have had to surmount several First Amendment obstacles. First,
Irving would be considered a public figure, since as a successful
writer and lecturer, he enjoys greater access to channels of
communication.180 As a result, he would have had the burden of
proving that Deborah Lipstadt published defamatory statements
174

See Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 13.167.
See Vick & MacPherson, supra note 3, at 627 (noting that “under English rule a
defeated defendant is responsible for the plaintiff’s costs and legal fees”).
176
See Roy Ulrich, supra note 26, at A21.
177
Vikram Dodd, Irving Ordered to Pay £150,000 Interim Costs, THE GUARDIAN
(Manchester), May 6, 2000, at 10.
178
See id.
179
See id.
180
In Lerman v. Flynt Distribution Co., the Court of Appeals established a four-part
test to determine who is a limited-purpose public figure. 745 F.2d 123, 136-37 (2d Cir.
1984). The court stated that:
A defendant must show that the plaintiff has: 1) successfully invited public
attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is
subject of litigation; 2) voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy
related to the subject of the litigation; 3) assumed a position of prominence in
the public controversy; and 4) maintained regular and continuing access to the
media.
Id.
175
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with actual malice.181 Actual malice requires a showing of
knowledge that the statements were false or made in reckless
disregard of the truth.182 Under these standards, it is unlikely that
Irving would be able to defeat a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment.
A. Applicable Law
U.S. libel law places the burden of proof on the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs in libel actions may have private or public figure status.
Public figure plaintiffs must prove that the defendant published
with actual malice, meaning the defendant had knowledge that the
statement was false or published with reckless disregard of
whether the statement was false or not.183 In addition, the plaintiff
must provide evidence of actual malice to survive a summary
judgment motion.184
1. Actual Malice
The Supreme Court of the United States first established a
federal libel standard in 1964 with the landmark decision of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.185 Prior to New York Times, U.S. libel
law was almost identical to the English common law of libel.186
Before 1964, U.S. libel was a tort found only in common law, and
like current English law, the defendant assumed the burden of
proving the truth.187
181
See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (holding that in
defamation cases involving speech of public concern the plaintiff has the burden of
proving falsity); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (holding public figures
must bear the burden of showing by a clear and convincing standard that the defendant
published with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth).
182
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
183
Id. at 280.
184
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
185
See id. The Court established a precedent that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages from a defamatory falsehood without proof that the Defendant made
the statement with actual malice, or “knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 279-80.
186
See Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run
Around U.S. Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 235, 239 (1994).
187
See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 265-69 (stating that Alabama law reflected common
law and that under Alabama law the defendant has the burden of proving truth).

MULVIHILL.FINAL

246

12/28/00 7:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:217

In New York Times, the Supreme Court departed from the
common law tradition holding that a public official could not
recover damages for defamation without proving, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the defendant published the defamatory
statement with actual malice.188 The rationale for this decision
rested on the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression
on issues of public concern.189 New York Times also changed the
evidentiary standard, requiring the plaintiff to show actual malice
with “convincing clarity”190 rather than a mere preponderance of
the evidence, the standard which was previously required of the
defendant.191
In holding certain libel actions up to First
Amendment scrutiny, the Court shifted the burden of proof from
the defendant to the plaintiff.192 In a subsequent decision, Gertz v.
Robert Welch,193 the Court determined that for both public officials
and public figures, the showing of actual malice was subject to a
clear and convincing standard of proof.194
The Court clarified the New York Times malice standard in a
later case, St. Amant v. Thompson.195 Actual malice, the Court
said, requires a showing of either deliberate falsification or
reckless publication “despite the publisher’s awareness of probable
falsity.”196 The Court stated that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant published the statement in bad faith, noting that, “[t]here
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the
defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his
publication.”197 In addition, the Court stated that “[f]ailure to
investigate does not itself establish bad faith.”198 Under the actual
malice standard, even a deliberate alteration of the words uttered
by the plaintiff does not constitute knowledge of falsity unless the
alteration materially changes the meaning of the speaker’s
188
See id. at 279-80. The Court defined malice as knowledge that the defamatory
statement was false or reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or not. Id.
189
See id. at 269.
190
Id. at 285-86.
191
See id.
192
See id. at 279.
193
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
194
See id. at 342. (noting that in a libel action brought against the publisher of
magazine article that called the Plaintiff a communist, the Court held that the Defendant
could not claim constitutional privilege on the basis of discussion of public issue).
195
390 U.S. 727, 730-31 (1968).
196
Id. at 731 (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967)).
197
Id.
198
Id. at 733 (citing N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. at 287-88).

MULVIHILL.FINAL

2000]

12/28/00 7:08 PM

IRVING V. PENGUIN: HISTORIANS ON TRIAL

247

words.199
The inquiry into actual malice focuses on the
defendant’s belief regarding truthfulness.200
2. Public Figures
A logical extension of the New York Times rule followed three
years later in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.201 The Supreme
Court extended the New York Times heightened standard to include
nonpublic officials or public figures who are “intimately involved
in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of
their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.”202
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.203 the Court discussed the
rationale underlying the distinction between public and private
figures.204 Public figures have “greater access to the channels of
effective communication and hence have a more realistic
opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals
normally enjoy.”205 The Court divided its discussion of public
figures into two categories: limited-purpose and all-purpose public
figures.206
Examples of all-purpose public figures are rare, and “[a]bsent
clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and
pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual
should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his
life.”207 Some examples of all-purpose public figures include
political candidates,208 entertainers,209 political and social
activists,210 and well-known writers and critics.211 Most public
199

See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 170 (1979) (permitting Plaintiff to probe the
editorial decision-making process of Defendant and noting that New York Times and its
progeny require the plaintiff to focus on the defendant’s subjective state of mind).
201
388 U.S. 130 (1967) (Defendant published an article accusing the Plaintiff, the
athletic director of the University of Georgia, of attempting to fix a game between the
University of Georgia and the University of Alabama.).
202
Id. at 164.
203
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
204
See id.
205
Id. at 344.
206
See id. at 351.
207
See id. at 352.
208
See, e.g., Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d. Cir. 1969).
209
See, e.g., Burnett v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1983); Eastwood v.
Superior Court of L.A. County, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1983).
210
See, e.g., Falwell v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 521 F. Supp. 1204 (1981); Nader v. de
200
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figures are limited-purpose public figures who have intentionally
become embroiled in particular controversies in order to influence
the resolution of the issues involved.212
The extent to which the plaintiff has voluntarily thrust himself
into a public controversy is one of the most important factors in
determining limited-purpose public figure status.213 In cases
following Gertz, the Court has given the voluntariness requirement
even greater importance.214
3. Summary Judgment
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,215 the Supreme Court held
that summary judgment must be granted in defamation cases in
which “actual malice” was at issue, unless the plaintiffs
demonstrated that they will be able to present “clear and
convincing evidence” of actual malice.216 The Court ruled that a
trial judge must consider the “quantum and quality of proof
necessary to support liability under New York Times.”217
Defense motions for summary judgment are commonplace in
suits involving public figure plaintiffs.218 Summary judgment
motions have proven to be a powerful tool against public figure
defamation plaintiffs.219 In 1995 and 1996, defendants were

Toledano, 408 A.2d 31 (D.C. 1979).
211
See, e.g., Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976); Montandon v. Triangle
Publ’ns, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1975); Maule v. NYM Corp., 76 A.D. 2d 58 (1980);
Braden v. News World Communications, Inc., 22 Media L. Rep. 1065 (D.C. Super. 1993)
212
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
213
See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 2:31.
214
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976) (holding that
seeking a divorce did not constitute a voluntary act or an assumption of the risk sufficient
to render the Plaintiff a public figure); Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157
(1979) (holding that Plaintiff Wolston had not voluntarily entered the controversy
surrounding the investigation of Soviet espionage, but had been dragged into the
controversy unwillingly); Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133-36 (1979) (holding
that a professor who voluntarily applied for federal funds was a limited-purpose public
figure for the purpose of commentary on his publicly-funded research).
215
477 U.S. 242 (1986).
216
Id. at 255.
217
Id. at 254.
218
See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 12:75
219
See Press Releases, LDRC Bulletin 1997 No. 3: Report on Summary Judgment,
available at http://www.ldrc.com/sumjud.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).

MULVIHILL.FINAL

2000]

12/28/00 7:08 PM

IRVING V. PENGUIN: HISTORIANS ON TRIAL

249

successful in 85.2% of summary judgment motions against public
figure plaintiffs.220
B. Irving v. Penguin under U.S. Libel Law
David Irving enjoys considerable access to the media through his
own books and invitations to speak to organizations around the
world. As a result, he would be considered a public figure for
purposes of U.S. libel law. If Irving brought suit against Penguin
Books and Lipstadt in the United States, he would have the burden
of proving the falsity of Lipstadt’s statements, and he would be
required to prove New York Times malice in order to avoid a
summary judgment in Lipstadt’s favor.
1. Irving as a Public Figure
Irving is a successful writer and lecturer.
He “enjoys
significantly greater access to the channels of effective
communication”221 and would probably be considered an allpurpose public figure in a U.S. defamation action. The facts
clearly support this conclusion, since Irving has written over thirty
books,222 and even before Denying the Holocaust David Irving was
a familiar name in England.223
Before the trial, Irving challenged Lipstadt’s statements in many
arenas. Irving disputed Lipstadt’s allegations at lectures and
maintained a website where he posted the evidence supporting his
historical conclusions and propaganda.224 On the website, he
provided his daily diary entries concerning the events of the trial,
220

See id.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974).
222
See generally SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 2:87 (stating that “[w]riters, critics and
columnists may achieve sufficiently pervasive fame and influence to achieve all-purpose
public figure status”).
223
See Sarah Lyall, Critic of Holocaust Denier is Cleared in British Libel Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, April 12, 2000, at A1 (noting that Irving is the author of more than 30 books,
some of which have been highly admired, notably “Hitler’s War” (1977)); see also
Vikram Dodd, Irving: Consigned to History as a Racist Liar, THE GUARDIAN
(Manchester), Apr. 12, 2000, at 1 (reporting that “Irving had increased his political
activity over the past fifteen years, addressing far right audiences in the U.S., Germany,
Canada and the new world”).
224
See David Irving’s Action Report On-Line, at http://www.fpp.co.uk (last visited
November 1, 2000).
221
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texts of his lectures, and some of his books. Irving also owns the
company that published his last book.225
In Lamkin-Asam v. Miami Daily News, Inc.,226 the court held
that a scientist who had written a book about her search for
research grants to develop a cure for cancer was an all-purpose
public figure.227 The court found that the Plaintiff’s efforts to
arouse public indignation and influence the allocation of public
funds, participation in public debates in health matters, publication
of her autobiography and other writings and speeches, and efforts
to seek substantial publicity, among other things, aggregately gave
her public figure status as a matter of law.228 Similarly, a court
addressing Irving’s public figure status would review Irving’s
publicity-seeking behavior, and most likely find him an all-purpose
public figure.
Alternatively, Irving would at least be considered a limitedpurpose public figure for the purpose of this trial, since he
voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of the debate by
successfully inviting public attention to his views prior to the
litigation, and maintaining access to the media.229 Through the
225

See DAVID IRVING, NUREMBERG, THE LAST BATTLE (1997), which was published
by Focal Point Publications, Irving’s publishing imprint. Cf. Loeb v. Globe Newspaper
Co., 489 F. Supp. 481 (D. Mass. 1980) (holding that Plaintiff, a newspaper owner who
“regularly takes strong public stands on controversial issues . . . (and who) invites
expression of contrary opinion” is a public figure).
226
408 So. 2d 666 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
227
See id. at 668.
228
See id.
229
See Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
The court stated in part:
Before a plaintiff can be classified, as a matter of law, as a limitedpurpose public figure, the defendant must prove that: (1) the plaintiff has
access to channels of effective communication; (2) the plaintiff
voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in the public
controversy; (3) the plaintiff sought to influence the resolution or
outcome of the controversy; (4) the controversy existed prior to the
publication of the defamatory statement; and, (5) the plaintiff retained
public figure status at the time of the alleged defamation.
Id. at 534.
In Lerman v. Flynt Distribution Co., Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
specifically defined what constitutes a limited-purpose public figure. See 745 F.2d 123
(2d Cir. 1984). The court stated:
A defendant must show the plaintiff has: (1) successfully invited public
attention to his views in an effort to influence others prior to the incident that is
the subject of the litigation; (2) voluntarily injected himself into a public
controversy related to the subject of the litigation; (3) assumed a position of
prominence in the public controversy; and (4) maintained regular and
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publication of over thirty books on the subject of World War II and
numerous lectures and public debates on the subject of the
Holocaust and Hitler’s involvement, Irving has voluntarily thrust
himself into the Holocaust debate.
Irving could be considered a public figure merely by reason of
having published books.230 Courts have consistently held that
authors may be public figures for the purpose of libel actions due
to the subject of their works.231 According to this reasoning, Irving
would be a public figure for the purpose of the libel action because
Lipstadt’s statements concerned the subject of his books.
2. Actual Malice
As a public figure, Irving would have the burden of proving that
Lipstadt’s statements are false and that she and Penguin Books
published those statements with knowledge of their falsity or
reckless disregard for whether they were false. Lipstadt would
probably move for summary judgment on the ground that there
continuing access to the media.
Id. at 136-37.
In Lerman, the court applied these factors to the Plaintiff, Jackie Collins Lerman, who
was a prominent author on topics dealing largely with evolving sexual mores in society.
The court found that Lerman was in fact a public figure with respect to a lawsuit in which
the Defendant publication had printed her name next to a picture of a nude woman.
Because Lerman had voluntarily written works catering to the public’s interest in sexual
mores, she was “deemed to have purposefully surrendered part of what would otherwise
have been her protectable privacy rights, at least those related in some way to her
involvement in writing her books and screenplays.” Id. at 137. In considering whether
Lerman had injected herself into a “public controversy” related to the Defendant’s
publication, the court noted that “[a] public ‘controversy’ is any topic upon which
sizeable segments of society have different, strongly held views.” Id. at 138.
230
See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 2:87.
231
See, e.g., Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 404 F. Supp. 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting
that by adapting Ernest Hemingway’s books for television, movies, records, and ballet,
the author had voluntarily injected himself into a public controversy concerning the latter
years of Hemingway’s life); see also Joseph v. Xerox Corp., 594 F. Supp. 330 (D.D.C.
1984) (holding that a lawyer who wrote a book about legal self-representation was a
public figure for purposes limited to the subject of the book); Knudsen v. Kansas Gas &
Elec. Co., 807 P.2d 71 (Kan. 1991) (holding that a freelance writer whose article was
published in a newspaper became a public figure by writing the article which was the
basis of the allegedly defamatory statements); Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730 (7th
Cir. 1994) (holding authors of books were limited-purpose public figures when bringing
suit against Defendants who made public assertions challenging the accuracy of the
books); Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating “anyone who
publishes becomes a public figure in the world bounded by the readership of the literature
to which he has contributed”).
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was no genuine issue of material fact,232 since Irving would be
unable to prove actual malice. Irving would be forced to show that
a reasonable jury could find actual malice with convincing
clarity.233
The standard of proof for actual malice is higher than the typical
civil requirement of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.234
To prove actual malice, the plaintiff must demonstrate with clear
and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that the
statements were false or that the defendant subjectively entertained
doubts as to the truth of the statements.235 In addition, actual
malice must be pleaded with specificity.236 Thus, public figure
plaintiffs rarely overcome summary judgment motions.237 One
court stated that “defamation actions should be disposed of at the
earliest possible stage of the proceedings if the facts as alleged are
insufficient as a matter of law to support a judgment for the
plaintiff.”238 Deborah Lipstadt clearly believed what she wrote
was true. She gathered her information from many sources, and
published in good faith. Lipstadt’s belief in her statements would
preclude a finding of actual malice since there must be sufficient
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant “entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.”239
A determination of whether the defendant published with actual
malice is an inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant.240 The
question of Lipstadt’s state of mind arose in connection with the
Irving case in London.241 Throughout the trial, Irving claimed that
232

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
See Adler v. Conde Nast Publ’ns Inc., 643 F. Supp. 1558, 1565 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
234
See World Boxing Council v. Cosell, 715 F. Supp. 1259, 1262 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
235
See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
236
See Nicosia v. De Rooy, 72 F. Supp.2d 1093, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 1999); see also
Barger v. Playboy Enters., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Kottle v.
Northwest Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen ‘a plaintiff seeks
damages . . . for conduct which is prima facie protected by the First Amendment, the
danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of First Amendment
rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required.’” (citation
omitted)).
237
See Press Releases, LDRC Bulletin 1997 No. 3: Report on Summary Judgment,
available at http://www.ldrc.com/sumjud.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2000).
238
See Dorsey v. National Enquirer, Inc., 973 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1992).
239
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991) (quoting St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)).
240
See id.
241
See Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., No. 1996-I-1113, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 3.8 (Q.B.
Apr. 11, 2000).
233
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Lipstadt was the head of a conspiracy to damage his reputation as a
historian and silence him,242 an argument he used to support his
request for aggravated damages.243
Irving relied on the fact that Lipstadt did not attempt to verify
the statements that she made, that she continued to publish the
defamatory statements, and that she was the “prime mover” in an
international Jewish conspiracy to prevent the dissemination of his
books, ensuring that he is banned from as many countries as
possible.244 Because the conspiracy theory was Irving’s only proof
of Lipstadt’s state of mind, it is likely that Irving would assert this
argument as proof of actual malice in a court in the United States.
The conspiracy assertion would not suffice as proof of actual
malice since it is a mere assertion of spite or ill will toward
Irving.245 Though spite or animus toward the plaintiff is
circumstantial evidence of actual malice, it cannot serve alone as a
basis for actual malice.246 In addition, Irving would be unable to
plead this argument with specificity. In London, he simply
mentioned Lipstadt’s association with groups such as the AntiDefamation League.247 A U.S. court would likely find that
Lipstadt’s personal animosity toward, and disagreement with,
Irving’s views does not create an inference of actual malice.
III. COMPARISON OF THE ENGLISH AND U.S. LIBEL SYSTEMS
The presumption of falsity is one of the fundamental differences
between English and U.S. libel law.248 Another difference is the
lack of fault requirement making libel a strict liability tort in
England.249 The most critical difference between American and
English libel law, however, is that English libel law recognizes no

242

See id. ¶ 3.6.
See id. ¶ 3.8.
244
See id.
245
See Masson, 501 U.S. at 510.
246
See Shoen v. Shoen, 48 F.3d 412 (9th Cir. 1995); Hinerman v. Daily Gazette Co.,
423 S.E. 2d 560, 573 (W. Va. 1992); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 665 (1989).
247
Irving, 2000 WL 362478, ¶ 3.8.
248
See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 1:9.
249
See R.W.M. DIAS & B.S. MARKESINIS, supra note 31, at 160; see also SMOLLA,
supra note 30, § 1:9.
243

MULVIHILL.FINAL

254

12/28/00 7:08 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol.11:217

special protection for defamation actions arising from critiques of
public figures or public officials.250
One must bear in mind that victories for defendants in libel
cases, such as Irving, are rare in England.251 By suing for libel in
England, Irving deprived Lipstadt of scholastic research for four
years and caused the defense to spend over UK£3 million in expert
reports, discovery, and legal fees.252 Additionally, the expense of a
legal defense and the time invested may be enough to discourage
authors and scholars from expressing criticism of historians such
as Irving in the English media.
Two aspects of English libel law, the expense of pursuing or
defending a claim and the threat of huge damages and costs, have
created a system that works to the advantage of the wealthy.253
English libel law has been commonly criticized for awarding
verdicts that are “too high and as uncertain as a lottery.”254 In
addition, a defeated party bears responsibility for litigation costs,
which in libel cases often approach the size of the verdict itself.255
Legal aid is unavailable in libel cases, and contingency fee
arrangements are prohibited in England.256 Consequently, the cost
of pursuing a libel claim has become prohibitive for all except the
wealthy or those backed by organizations with significant financial
resources.257
Furthermore, the odds against defendants in English libel cases
are staggering. In 1990, plaintiffs prevailed in eighty-eight percent

250

See SMOLLA, supra note 31, § 1:9.
See HOOPER, supra note 28, app. at 483-523. In 1998, plaintiffs won thirty out of
thirty-two libel cases adjudicated in England. In 1999, plaintiffs won fourteen out of
seventeen cases adjudicated. See id. at 517-23.
252
As the losing party, Irving bore the burden of the costs, but it is unlikely that, a
private citizen, will be able to pay. See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 2, at 626-27
(1997). Journalists have predicted that Irving will declare bankruptcy and Penguin will
never see a penny of the costs. See Dodd, supra note 218, at 1 (reporting that Irving
denied having enough money to cover the cost of his defeat, that he was facing
bankruptcy, and that the head of Penguin Books UK felt it was unlikely that all costs
would be recovered).
253
See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 626-27.
254
KAYE, supra note 40, at 652; see also Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 62627.
255
See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 627.
256
See id.; see also HOOPER, supra note 28, at 459.
257
See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 3, at 627; see also HOOPER, supra note 28, at
459.
251
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of the cases adjudicated,258 and, in 1999, only two defendants
prevailed in defamation trials.259
It is likely that a defendant who publishes the truth will
nonetheless be silenced by a wealthy, litigious plaintiff in a
London court. This pitfall of English libel law was recently
demonstrated in a series of cases involving a large drug
manufacturer against an individual scientist.260
The drug
manufacturer, Upjohn Company (“Upjohn”), sued Professor Ian
Oswald, a scientist who had studied sleep deprivation drugs for
over thirty years, for criticizing Halcion, a drug manufactured by
Upjohn. Specifically, Upjohn sued Professor Oswald for alleging
that Upjohn withheld adverse findings about the sleeping pill.261
Professor Oswald pleaded justification and lost.262 The legal cost
of the action were estimated at over UK£2.5 million,263 and Judge
May awarded Upjohn UK£25,000 in damages.264 The Upjohn
decision was thoroughly criticized because the English libel laws
allowed a powerful drug company to silence a critic, and
essentially through a costly legal battle, suppressed the critic’s
right to voice a public concern.265

258

See Vick & Macpherson, supra note 27, at 943.
See HOOPER, supra note 28, app. at 523.
260
The Upjohn Company and Another v. Oswald; Drucker v. Oswald; The Upjohn
Company v. British Broadcasting Corporation and Another, Q.B. 27 May 1994, available
in LEXIS, England and Whales Reported and Unreported Cases [hereinafter Upjohn].
For analysis of the case see James Penzi, Libel Actions In England, A Game of Truth or
Dare? Considering the Recent Upjohn Case and the Consequences of “Speaking Out”,
10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 211 (1996).
261
See James Penzi, supra note 260, at 219.
262
See id. at 225.
263
See Penzi, supra note 261, at 223. The case was severely criticized because
Upjohn chose to sue in England, basing jurisdiction on the existence of an Upjohn
subsidiary in England and the sale of 100 copies of the New York Times. See id. at 219,
228 nn. 90, 91; HOOPER, supra note 28, at 192.
264
See Hooper, supra note 28, app. at 505. Concurrent to the trial, the United States
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) reexamined Halcion and Upjohn’s contentions
regarding the safety of the drug. The FDA examined the submissions by Upjohn and
determined that Upjohn had indeed been lying and concealing evidence for twenty years.
In reviewing the same 1972 test that Dr. Oswald had so vehemently criticized, the FDA
determined that Upjohn’s excuse of “transcription errors” was false and misleading. The
FDA also determined that Upjohn’s senior management knew about the adverse reactions
to Halcion and deliberately failed to report data from certain studies. The FDA findings,
however, released near the end of the libel trial, were not admitted into evidence. See id.
at 198-200.
265
See Penzi, supra note 261, at 224-25.
259
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CONCLUSION
In light of Irving, it is tempting to believe that libel law in
England provides more freedom to both parties. Irving was
permitted to sue Lipstadt, but he ultimately lost. In the United
States, plaintiffs who are unable to show actual malice may not
even make it to trial due to summary judgment. In contrast, the
English public rejoiced over the official denunciation of Irving as a
racist and a liar.266
The English rule placing the burden on libel defendants can be
justified on the grounds that publishers and writers like Lipstadt
should be able to prove the truth of what they write. On the other
hand, writers may choose not to publish certain newsworthy, true,
and critical statements, because they are concerned about whether
they will be able to prove that the statements are true. Moreover,
libel plaintiffs such as Upjohn can bring and win suits contesting
the publication of true stories because defendants do not always
have the resources to obtain evidence to prove the truth. “The
irony is that the law deters critical reporting of precisely those
whose activities most directly affect legitimate public interest.”267
The Irving case illustrates this irony: after challenging Irving’s
integrity on a matter of public debate, Deborah Lipstadt was only
able to prove the truth of her statements through 2,000 pages of
expert reports and over UK£3 million worth of legal expertise
against a pro se plaintiff.
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